Institutional theory: reflections on ontology by Edwards, Timothy James
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY: REFLECTIONS ON ONTOLOGY  
 
Tim Edwards 
Cardiff Business School 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The philosophical foundations of institutional theory continue to be obscured by the 
problem of meta-theory, the ontological ideas that necessarily underpin institutional theory. 
These concern statements about the way the social world is, of the relationship between 
human agents and social structures and the transformational nature of that relationship. These 
are significant issues because ontology informs how scholars approach the phenomena they 
want to study, shaping the research questions asked and the methodology adopted, which 
informs what can be said about it (Al-Amoudi and O’Mahoney, 2015). The origins of the 
issue reveal distinct points of connection and contention, of how institutional theory has been 
conceived across disciplines (Nielson, 2001; Mutch, Delbridge and Ventresca, 2006; 
DiMaggio, 2008), which for organizational studies scholars becomes apparent when looking 
at the concept of ‘isomorphism’. The points of connection concern the necessary role of 
agency in explaining institutionalization, the points of contention relates to the ontological 
assumptions that might underpin the agency-structure relationship. 
The notion of isomorphism has been scrutinised by scholars interested in institutional 
logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012) and related sub-
themes around institutional work (DiMaggio, 1988; Zucker 1988b; Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006) and institutional complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury, 
2011) because this work tended to focus on institutionalization as an outcome rather than as a 
process (DiMaggio, 2008). Early institutional reviews confirm the explanatory limitations of 
treating isomorphism as an outcome. For DiMaggio (1988) the puzzle was to begin to explain 
institutional entrepreneurship in highly institutionalized fields whereas for Zucker (1988b) 
the opposite issue was observed, which was to explain institutional stability in the context of 
social entropy. For both the challenge was to overcome the totalising assumptions pervading 
previous institutional studies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which meant giving explanatory 
attention to the way actors mobilised their interests to change or stabilise their social world. 
For Zucker this presented an opportunity to assess “self-interest introduced by non-
institutional processes” (1988: 44) that for DiMaggio in contrast meant considering 
institutionalization as “a product of the political efforts of actors to accomplish their ends” 
(1988: 13). By drawing attention to these different interactional dynamics both scholars, 
albeit with a different emphasis, created an important point of departure for institutional 
scholars, which was to encourage them to re-consider and explain institutionalization 
processes.  
To this end, many scholars found utility in the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) who, 
building on Berger and Luckman’s (1967) idea of the ‘mutual constitution of individuals and 
society’, developed the notion of structuring based on the reciprocal causality of the duality 
of structure (Jones, 2015). The adoption of Giddens’ ideas seemed appropriate because 
previous institutional scholarship that had drawn inspiration from social interactionism 
(Blumer, 1962) clearly resonated: “the notion of structuring was long latent in interactionist 
scholarship [while] structural duality was also implicit in how interactionists understood the 
core concepts around which they organized their research” (DiMaggio, 2008: 499, italics in 
original). ‘Exposing’ these conceptual links precipitated growth in structurational accounts of 
institutionalization (Barley, 1986; Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Lounsbury and Kaghan, 2001; 
Sandfort 2003; Battilana, 2006; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; DiMaggio, 2008) and it 
initiated a shift in the field prompting some scholars to reject an ‘empirical agenda’ that 
ignored how institutions were created, altered and reproduced to one that included new 
discussions of how to frame the reciprocal relationship between institutions and action 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
While this period of reflection enabled some scholars to move beyond concerns over 
‘isomorphism’ it is notable this process has only until recently included critical debate over 
the ontological merits of Giddens model of structuration and his interpretation of the mutual 
constitution of individuals and society, despite considerable – critical - deliberation elsewhere 
in sociology (Thompson, 1989; Layder, 1981; Cohen 1990; Archer, 1995; Stones, 2000). In 
many respects, interest in the ontological foundations of institutionalism has only just started 
to be taken seriously in the institutional field because it is only now that some scholars have 
begun to draw attention to the consequences of ontology for institutional research (see Mutch, 
Delbridge, Ventresca, 2006). In the case of Giddens’ work a counter point position based on 
an alternative view of structuring has emerged that relies on critical realism (CR) as a meta-
theory (Archer, 1995; 2003). This work is distinct in so far as rather than treating institutions 
as the medium and outcome of action based on the duality of structure critical realists, such 
as Margaret Archer (1995; 2003), propose to hold social structures and agency separate, 
based on analytical dualism. These conceptual ideas have been taken up by a small number 
of critical management theorists involved in institutional research who have proposed the 
merits of treating structure and agency as distinct categories of analysis albeit related through 
practice to advance explanations that prioritise the historical foundations of institutional 
arrangements, while at the same time pushing for a more developed appraisal of the “agent” 
involved in social interactions (Mutch, 2007; Leca and Naccache, 2006; Hesketh and 
Fleetwood, 2006; Delbridge and Edwards, 2013).  
In what follows my aim is to attend to the differences attentiveness to philosophy, or 
some element of it, might have for understanding (and advancing) institutional theory? The 
chapter proceeds with a brief review of those commentaries concerning the conceptual issues 
facing institutional scholars interested in dealing with agency in institutional accounts. This is 
followed by a discussion of the way Giddens’ ideas have informed recent institutional work, 
which is then followed by a CR counter point position and the consequences this has for the 
future development of the field.  Such reflections provide an opportunity to consider the role 
and significance of different ontologies for social science research, such as institutionalism. 
 
Tracing the debate over agency and structure in Institutional Theory 
 
Indication of the core conceptual issues pertaining to the development of institutional 
theory can be gleamed from the introductory remarks made by Lynne Zucker in an edited 
book written following an American Sociological Society conference on the ‘Problems of the 
Discipline’ (Zucker, 1988). It is perhaps telling when outlining the book that Zucker issues a 
cautionary note about the two conceptual chapters (written by her and Paul DiMaggio) on 
institutional work, because as she comments, they are “so different that it may be difficult to 
see how both can be labelled institutional” (1987: xiv). Her opening remarks indicate the lack 
of a coherent underpinning in institutional theory, because as she noted, DiMaggio showed 
that much of the institutional literature assumed social systems were tightly structured while 
for her these same systems were more likely to suffer from social entropy. This situation 
seemed to confirm the limits of agreement in explaining stasis and change, which confirmed 
the newness of the discipline (DiMaggio, 1988) but also the lack of understanding of 
ontology or even of its significance amongst exponents of institutionalism.  
According to DiMaggio the strength of institutional theory had been its focus on those 
parts of “organizational life that are so exteriorized and intersubjective that no actor is likely 
to question them” (1988: 6). DiMaggio draws attention to the early work of Selznick (1948) 
on norms and more latterly in the literature around taken-for-granted assumptions to explain 
why variation in actor interests was not deemed significant in explaining outcomes. For the 
most part, it was thought: “as long as action is guided by norms or constitutive expectations, 
variation in actor interest will not play a role in its outcome” (DiMaggio, 1988: 5). 
Expectations of high institutionalization confirmed institutions constituted ‘multifaceted, 
durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities and material 
resources’ that ensured stability and shared meaning (Scott, 2001: 49), and it was because 
actors preferred “certainty and predictability in organizational life” that institutional change 
was unlikely (DiMaggio 1988: 8). While this provided a strong rebuttal to rational-actor 
models of agency it was also apparent that this top-down version of social order presented a 
narrow view of that social world. It illustrated one mode of the agency-structure relationship 
rather than a statement about the range of possible sets of relationship that might emerge in 
different social settings.  
As DiMaggio went on to argue these foundational elements could not be allowed to 
set limits on what might be possible within an institutional framework. The issue concerned 
the introduction of agency within institutional theory, which meant establishing “the ways in 
which institutional and interest-based approaches to organizational change are consistent with 
and capable of enriching one another” (1998: 12). How agency and interest might be 
introduced and therefore jointly conceived was expressed as follows: 
Institutionalization is a product of the political efforts of actors to accomplish 
their ends and that the success of an institutionalization project and the form that 
the resulting institution takes depend on the relative power of the actors who 
support, oppose, or otherwise strive to influence it… Institutionalization as an 
outcome places organizational structures and practices beyond the reach of 
interests and politics. By contrast, institutionalization as a process is profoundly 
political and reflects the relative power or organized interests and the actors who 
mobilize around them (DiMaggio 1988: 13, italics in original). 
 
This is significant because DiMaggio suggests that institutions existed beyond simple 
manipulation (outcome) while change was an inherently agentic-political endeavour 
(process). His solution to this interactional paradox was to treat institutional work as 
‘situated’ in so far as institutions tended to persist when the material or ideal interests of 
actors aligned with existing arrangements and when these did not align due to emergent 
political interests then the potential for deinstitutionalization was likely. The implication was 
that the agency-structure relationship shifted in respect of ‘situated’ sets of institution-related 
processes when actors mobilised organized interests. To explain change DiMaggio suggests 
that actors could ‘push against’ institutions because the internal dynamics of institutional 
processes presented space for actors to bargain and negotiate, at which point new and 
alternative institutional forms could be envisioned.  
Zucker (1988b) maps-out a different version of social order, one that emphasises 
social entropy. This contrasts with DiMaggio’s framing in so far as his discussion draws 
attention to the challenge of changing institutions and hence asks institutional scholars to 
explain the scope for institutional entrepreneurship despite pressures towards stasis (Holm, 
1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Delbridge and Edwards, 2008; Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 
2009). Zucker, on the other hand, draws attention to social entropy, which means institutions 
tend to decay and therefore have to be ‘actively’ maintained (Zucker, 1988a: xv). The issue 
was to examine the relationship between what Zucker (1988b) described as institutional and 
non-institutional processes as well as multi-level discrepancies between micro and macro 
level processes. As Zucker described: “entropy in a social system is increased not only by the 
natural decay of institutional elements and by self-interest introduced by non-institutional 
processes, it is also increased by inconsistencies or even conflict between social order at the 
macro- and micro-levels” (1988: 44).  
Here Zucker drew attention to distinctions between the micro and macro order, which 
are variations between different levels of analysis, between the actions of individuals at a 
local, organizational level and the broader institutions that spanned much wider tracts of time 
and space. Attention focused on times when the micro and macro lost ‘synchronicity’ when 
endogenous processes of decay might occur. What is interesting about Zucker’s work is that 
she treated levels of analysis as distinct categories of social reality albeit interconnected by 
social practice (Friedland and Alford, 1991). DiMaggio also argued that while institutions 
may be enduring institutional processes connected these structures with the actors involved. 
In each, the problem of the agency-structure relationship focused around a common dilemma 
albeit articulated differently of how to link institutions and actors without reverting to 
determinism or allowing rational-action models in through the rear door. While both wanted 
to conceptualise the links between actors and the social order shaping action neither 
developed an articulated social ontology. Instead, the issue of stasis and change in 
institutional analysis remained unresolved albeit with this loosely framed by the idea that 
institutions endure and decay and that in some way these processes inculcate actors who are 
not social dopes because institutions do not have totalizing effects on action. 
 
The first tentative moves toward a social ontology of institutional theory 
Moves towards specifying a social ontology of institutional theory explicitly emerged 
in the work of Barley and Tolbert (1997). This seminal paper mapped-out those unarticulated 
ontological ideas often implied in many institutional studies and reviews (Zucker, 1988a) that 
were now aligned with the work of Anthony Giddens (1984), as was specified in his theory of 
society (also see DiMaggio, 2008). Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) structurational model of 
institutions was firmly based on a ‘praxis’ reading of institutionalization because it was 
claimed that earlier institutional work was consistent with the causal idea of the ‘duality of 
structure’ (i.e. structuring), even though much of this work focused on the outcomes of 
institutional processes. In particular, they argued that DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) concept 
of field explicitly demonstrated that “institutions exhibit an inherent duality: they both arise 
from and constrain social action” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 96). And, consistent with this 
they argued that fields could only be understood in terms of the interactions ensuring their 
existence. For DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148) fields only existed to the extent they were 
institutionally defined and institutional definition relied on interactions among actors and 
broader structures, the field; such interactions required actors to be knowledgeable (not social 
dopes) as they had to be aware of a shared enterprise; and structures constrained action due to 
inter-organizational structures of domination (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). 
This interpretation presented an opportunity to specify interactions as the mechanism 
through which agency and structure connected, and in doing so, it seemed possible to resolve 
the ‘problem’ of earlier institutional scholarship that had treated institutions as exogenous to 
organizational action (e.g., Meyer and Scott, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1987; Sutton et al, 1994; 
Scott and Meyer, 1994). Overcoming this issue was seen as necessary because it rectified the 
problem of reification when institutions were depicted “as somehow distinct from those who 
comply and, more importantly, from the act of compliance itself” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 
96). Here Barley and Tolbert (1997) specified a social reality whereby institutions no longer 
existed separately from practice and by implication individuals could not be specified outside 
of a social context. Put in the context of the earlier work of DiMaggio (1988) and Zucker 
(1988b), the solution for accounting for institutions as outcomes and processes was to focus 
on the social practices that could be used to frame the connections between the institutional 
realm and realm of action (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
Building on Giddens’ model but elaborating in ways that revealed earlier adaptations 
(see Barley, 1986) they define institutions as the “shared rules and typifications that identify 
categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley and 
Tolbert, 1997: 96, italics in original), which in keeping with Giddens’ meant institutions were 
to social action as grammars are to speech: 
  
Speech allows for an infinite variety of expressions, yet to be comprehensible, 
every expression must conform to an underlying set of tacitly understood rules 
that specify relations between classes of lexemes. Similarly, social actions may 
vary in their particulars, but to be interpretable their contours must conform to 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the activities and interactions appropriate 
for different classes of actors. (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 96-97). 
 
This meant institutions were enacted through scripts (Barley, 1986) - the “observable, 
recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting” (Barley 
and Tolbert, 1997: 99) that encoded the logic of a specific setting which appeared as local 
variations of broader institutional principles. In this sense, institutions only became manifest 
when actors used them as stocks of practical knowledge to engage in social behaviour. These 
features of the ontology of praxis indicated actors were capable of skillful action rather than 
reflecting taken-for-granted norms in the manner of simple cultural dopes (Fligstein, 1997); 
institutions were constituted in practice, they did not exist ‘out there’ (Bourdieu, 1977; 1993; 
de Certeau, 1984; Giddens, 1995; Lave & Wenger, 1991) and all action was in some way set 
around pre-existing institutionalized rules.  
While contexts revealed the imprint of institutions it was because actors were skillful 
they could modify them albeit depending on the unfolding context that may or may not lead 
to institutional change (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). These ideas offered a way to resolve the 
issues rose by Zucker (1988) because they accommodated ‘micro and macro processes’ that 
may or may not be synchronized and because the ‘political negotiations’ (DiMaggio, 1988) 
that implicated actors in the enactment of scripts could now be explained with reference to 
the skillful, knowledgeable actor. 
 
Tensions in the ontology of practice 
In developing their model it is noteworthy that Tolbert and Zucker (1997) were quite 
aware of the criticisms made by some scholars unwilling to treat structure and agency as a 
duality or inseparable (Thompson, 1989; Layder, 1981; Cohen 1990; Archer, 1995). Treating 
agency and structure as complementary features (Thompson, 1989: 58) was viewed as a key 
problem in Giddens’ model because, as Archer (1995: 93-94) had contended, an examination 
of the performance of social action resulted in conflationism: “By enjoining the examination 
of a single process in the present tense, issues surrounding the relative independence, causal 
influence and temporal precedence of the components have been eliminated at a stroke”. 
Although this was believed to settle reification the approach left little room, it was argued, to 
explore “prior structured distributions of vested interests” (Archer, 1995: 99). This was also 
recognized by Barley and Tolbert (1997: 99) who stated: “Unless an institution exists prior to 
action, it is difficult to understand how it can affect behaviour and how one can examine its 
implications for action or speak of action’s subsequent effects on the institution”.  
However, rather than deal with this ontological issue head-on they made the following 
– partial - concession:  
Although the critics of structuration theory have aimed their critique at problems 
they believe to be inherent to the theory’s logic and, for this reason, have 
sometimes argued for re-establishing the separation between structure and action 
that Giddens sought to transcend (Archer 1989: 103-104), we submit that the 
worth of the critique actually lies in the epistemological rather than the 
ontological issues that it raises (Barley and Tolbert, 1997: 99). 
 
While Barley and Tolbert (1997) wanted to separate actions and structures to be able 
to talk about the historicity of institutions they effectively stopped short of treating these 
features as distinct because they relied on scripts to frame the connection between agency and 
structure. The up-shot was a ‘side-step’ to the ontological question of the status of actors and 
institutions because the instantiation argument confined explanation to the enactment of 
scripts that did not “allow” structure to exist as prior to action, or agency as potentially 
separate to total ‘social specification’. A criticism of the framing of structuring from a 
Giddens’ perspective was that while this acknowledged actors were knowledgeable it did not 
really consider the sets of agentic processes that explained how actors made judgments about 
how they navigated situations, acting creatively (or perhaps not) (Archer, 1995). The focus on 
scripts was criticized because it was thought to flatten social reality despite an 
acknowledgement of the prior status of social structures and the importance of actors in 
explaining institutional stasis and change. 
These criticisms are reflected in the work of a small number of critical management 
scholars who have begun to debate the problem of conflationism within the institutional field 
(Mutch, Delbridge and Ventresca, 2006; Leca and Naccache, 2006; Hesketh and Fleetwood, 
2006; Mutch, 2007). These conversations reveal how questions over the nature of social 
reality are beginning to inform how institutional complexity and change is researched as 
examples of conditioned action (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013). 
 
Points of contention: ontology in institutional theory 
As noted, issues around ontology have percolated debates in institutional theory since 
the work of Barley and Tolbert (1997). To this end, an emergent body of work derived from 
CR has for some represented a significant move to adding ‘a firmer grounding’ to current 
theorizing (Palmer, Biggart & Dick, 2008). This ontology is based on the analytical dualism 
of CR, which in recognizing the pre-existence of social structures provides the conceptual 
framework for empirical investigation into how such structures, such as institutions ‘impact’ 
agents. This is based on the basic idea that to explore how actors, with differing perceptions 
and depth of knowledge of their contexts engage in institutional processes, it is necessary to 
commit to an empirical strategy that specifies such processes according to: structure, social 
interplay and outcome. This is consistent with a diachronic model of social reality but differs 
in important ways to that specified by Barley and Tolbert (1997) because specific attention is 
given to explaining how institutions pre-date action and in treating actors as distinct 
categories of analysis. The key distinction is that while such a view recognises the 
importance of practice in terms of process the analysis is not restricted to those social 
interactions. This is because the analysis explores the structural condition of action and then 
looks at how actors engage in practice given the relationality between social structures and 
the reflexive capacities of actors (Archer, 2003). The key difference is that attention is given 
to the context of interaction (before that interaction) and to the reflexive abilities of actors as 
a feature of their institutional biography (Suddaby, Viale, and Gendron, 2012) as well as their 
social positioning (Archer, 2003). 
 
CR and analytical dualism 
The challenge facing scholars interested in proposing a CR ontology for institutional 
analysis is captured by Hesketh and Fleetwood (2006: 683, italics in original) when they 
state: 
Establishing the connection between critical realism and institutional theory is 
difficult not only because there are many versions of institutionalism, but also 
because critical realism, as a philosophy of science, inhabits a meta-theoretical 
domain, whereas institutionalism inhabits a theoretical domain: the role of meta-
theory is to interrogate the pre-suppositions of any theory. 
 
In this respect, Nielsen (2001) offers a useful review of different institutional theories 
or approaches, which allows him to confirm that in most cases other than institutionalism in 
political science (because of its commitment to positivism) such approaches are compatible 
with CR in respect of the following points. First: “Human agency is seen as purposeful, or 
intended rational, endowed with some freedom to deliberate or choose in accordance with 
individual psychology rather than, on the one hand, as irrational, automatic rule-followers or 
totally encapsulated in an externally defined role or, on the other hand, rational in the sense of 
isolated maximizing “economic man”” second: “they emphasize the constitutive importance 
of the cultural and cognitive framework”, third: “they recognize the central and pervasive role 
of power and conflict” and finally, “they focus on the role of institutions such as habits, 
routines, and norms in the coordination of behaviour” (p 512). As might be noted these same 
conditions are commensurate with Giddens’ structurational model; the difference for scholars 
of CR is in the way these features are conceived in terms of their specifity and relationality 
and therefore how they inform research practice.  
CR is a meta-theory rooted in ontology that asserts: “The social world consists of 
human agents and social structures by which we mean institutions, mechanisms, resources, 
rules, conventions, habits, procedures and so on” (Hesketh and Fleetwood, 2006: 685). To 
explain the transformational nature of the social world critical realists recognise that social 
systems can be either open or closed, which resonates with the commentaries of DiMaggio 
(1988) and Zucker (1988b). In the case of closed systems it is assumed that relationships and 
activities are highly regular, much in the same way as described by DiMaggio when referring 
to isomorphism. However, critical realists also acknowledge, as with Zucker (1988b) that the 
more common situation is when social systems are open and therefore lack event regularity 
(Fleetwood and Hesketh, 2006). In the case of open systems critical realists follow a different 
‘script’ to those advocating structuration theory. This is described by Thompson (1989: 74): 
To explore the space between the differential distribution of options, on the one 
hand, and the wants and needs of different kinds and different categories of 
individuals, on the other, is to examine the degrees of freedom and constraint 
which are entailed by social structure. Such an analysis would show that, while 
structure and agency are not antinomies, nevertheless they are not as 
complementary and mutually supporting as Giddens would like us to believe. 
 
How this is achieved relies on a different notion of social reproduction as compared to 
Giddens’ interpretation of ‘structuring’. For critical realist’s, rather than rely on the causality 
of the duality of structure the focus is ‘analytical dualism’, which is a ‘method for examining 
the interplay between these strata; it is analytical precisely because the two are inter-
dependent but it is dualistic because each stratum is held to have its own emergent properties’ 
(Archer, 1995: 133-134). CR is based on the main assumption “that structure necessarily 
predates the action(s) which transform it”. What this means is that institutions are “neither the 
creation of contemporary actors nor are ontologically reducible to ‘material existents’ (raw 
resources) and [not] dependent upon current acts of human instantiation (rule governed) for 
all their current effects” (Archer, 1995: 138). This is different to Giddens’ assertion, because 
“social systems only exist through their continuous structuration in the course of time” 
(Giddens, 1979: 217). 
In CR, institutions are the ‘generative mechanisms’ that give rise to social outcomes 
as empirical tendencies. The relationship between institutions and action is explained using a 
stratified ontology. Institutions condition action in specific ways because the meta-theory of 
CR specifies three ontological domains: the real, the actual and the empirical. Institutions 
constitute the real domain, which for critical realists cause social interactions (the domain of 
the actual) that are the subject of empirical observations (the domain of the empirical). The 
link between institutions and action is not straightforward because different societal orders 
may only function within a particular range of constraints, which as Archer (1995: 149) has 
noted means: “the emergent properties of structures and the actual experiences of agents are 
not synchronized”.  
Analytical dualism asserts there are discontinuities in the institutionalization process 
that indicate ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ moments. This reformulation of ‘structuring’ as 
discontinuous means that institutions have “emergent properties which are irreducible to the 
doings of contemporary actors, yet derive from the historical actions which generated them, 
thus creating the context for current action” (Archer, 1995: 139). This is the same for actors 
as they too are treated as in same part autonomous from the process of institutionalization. In 
this respect, the most recent work by Archer (2003) has added further ‘meat’ to the CR meta-
theory with greater attention being given to the concept of agency. These developments have 
also helped institutional scholars address the way in which Giddens’ frames actor 
knowledgeability because Archer (2003) draws attention to the ‘reflexive capacity’ of actor’s 
and their ability to see opportunities where others in the same position only see barriers.  
Archer’s work has been embraced by some scholars because she offers an insight into 
the properties and powers that are possessed by individuals as opposed to those pertaining to 
social forms. In particular, she draws attention to the range for reflexive deliberation 
available to actors, which is viewed as important because ‘agents have to diagnose their 
situations, they have to identify their own interests and they must design projects they deem 
appropriate to attaining their ends’ (2003: 9). This for some might appear to imply a reified 
representation of individuals but instead is a major feature of the CR project because it is 
assumed that no social structure “is constraining or causal tout court” (Hesketh and 
Fleetwood, 2006: 692). By holding agency and structure apart and treating each as having 
distinct emergent properties CR sets out to explain those distinct components that come 
together in social interaction but in ways that treat them as analytically separate. 
For Archer (2003), individuals embark on ‘agential enterprise’, which for that person 
is a personal project. Such projects are important because when actors deliberate over them 
they engage in a personal process that identifies the causal mechanisms – institutions and 
social structures – that connects to their agency (Hesketh and Fleetwood, 2006: 692). While 
institutions may have the power to facilitate or restrain action the significance of this power is 
contingent on those actors who conceive their projects. This means that institutions do not 
determine action rather such social structures shape action in-relation to the agentic 
properties of those engaged in action.  
 
Ontology shaping research: A case example 
An example of this CR inspired approach in the institutional literature is elaborated by 
Delbridge and Edwards, (2013) when they report on their research into the superyacht field. 
Here, they explain the historical development of the industry to explain variability in agency 
within different project arrangements. We see how their CR inspired treatment of agency and 
structure aids explanation by first giving attention to the ‘structural conditions’ that pre-date 
action: 
The importance of treating agency as discrete for analytical purposes in relation 
to organizational and plural institutional settings became apparent when we 
looked at the emergence of two different types of project – custom and in-house. 
Up until the early 1970s, yachts for the wealthy were designed, decorated and 
built in-house by a small number of European and American shipyards. It was 
only after the intervention of Jon Bannenberg that custom-built vessels emerged 
as a legitimate industry offering. Custom projects involve the shipyard with an 
independent designer in building a one-off yacht for a client, while in-house 
projects are conducted by the shipyard and their own design team, often building 
to an established formula. Each project type involves different levels of 
regulation associated with contractual arrangements and how actors engage in 
negotiations. For example, projects which rely on in-house shipyard designers 
for the creative input provide an environment where concerns over economic 
cost and efficiency… are prevalent in shaping design... However, in custom 
projects involving independent designers, rather than builds being shaped by 
risk and cost assessments set by the shipyard, there are usually moves to push 
the boundaries of the design and budget envelope. Under these conditions, 
which are characterized by a network arrangement (the independent designer is 
contracted to the client, not the shipyard), designers exercise their professional 
interests thereby involving the shipyards, their engineers and the client in 
potentially complex negotiations informed by varying expectations on 
aesthetics, functionality and cost (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013: 931). 
 
This historical analysis of two project arrangements – custom and in-house – confirm 
the tensions between different actors engaged in the same design and build process. The brief 
overview draws our particular attention to the configuration of organizational structures that 
shape subsequent social practices and it is because these pre-date action it is possible to show 
how different arrangements reveal different structures of domination relating to professional 
and market rules. This formulation necessarily maps-out the historicity and contentions that 
are often implicit in institutional processes (DiMaggio, 1988). However, these structures do 
not determine action because as Delbridge and Edwards (2013) go onto demonstrate some 
shipyard owners and willing designers created a new third project arrangement that meant the 
shipyard commissioned designers prior to finding a client for the vessel ensuring the risks 
associated with innovative design (custom builds) was largely negated:  
In recent years, several independent designers working with a well-established 
shipyard have introduced a new way of commissioning, which is to develop 
limited series of boats that have been ordered by the shipyard rather than a 
private client. The new project indicates the potential for actors working in 
particular actor positions to reflect further on their social worlds and to find 
alternate project arrangements to organize the design-and-build process. On this 
occasion, a well-resourced shipyard challenged the status quo in terms of the 
role of independent designers but did so with the co-operation of established and 
highly reputed designers who had a long-term relationship with the shipyard 
(based on custom builds). This was an opportunity for the shipyard management 
to shift the relations by co-opting the independent designers to work for them as 
the ‘client’. Interestingly, this worked both ways; while the new relations 
enabled managers to take control of the commissioning process, much in the 
same way as in-house projects have for other shipyards, it suited the independent 
designers as this guaranteed economic rents. Such changes show how estab-
lished institutional arrangements are not static and that the motivation for 
change can be driven by the reflexive deliberations of actors deeply embedded 
within the field (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013: 931, italics added). 
 
 
The reflexive deliberation of actors is a separate but necessary category in explaining 
the scope for agency. The process of developing limited series boats could not be adequately 
explained by the interactions of the designer and shipyard without first allowing conceptual 
space to explain the origins of these arrangements nor would it be sufficient without due care 
being given to the reflexive performance of the designer and shipyard managers. The reason 
why these actors decided on this course of action is explained around the ‘interplay between 
the subjective world of agents and the objective and independent world of social structures 
and institutions” (Hesketh and Fleetwood, 2006: 693). This formulation confirms the actions 
of agents are framed by increasing levels of complexity specified by the project arrangements 
and competing institutionalized rules around design and economics but at the same time the 
focus on interactions allow access to the agentic moves of different actors despite this 
complexity. 
 
Some implications of this alternative ontology for institutional studies 
Analytical dualism provides an alternative to the causality of the duality of structure 
and as such provides an alternative to explaining how institutions and agency as distinct yet 
interconnected levels of social reality connect (Archer, 1995; 2003). While scholars of CR 
see considerable potential in this meta-theory others continue to see problems with 
‘reductionism’ and ‘reification’ in the ontology (DiMaggio, 2008). However, there is growing 
evidence that scholars are also seeing problems in the focus on social practice. This is 
recognized by Hallett and Ventresca (2006: 229) who concede that the focus on interactions 
runs the risk of obscuring wider structures in the assessment of local interactions. This is 
echoed by Reed (2012: 206) who warns that our understanding of power elites, for example, 
must “be focused on the relations and interactions between corporate agents who have the 
‘structural place’ and ‘organizational power’ (Archer, 2003) to shape the governing structures 
and regimes through which the everyday lives of citizens are ordered and managed”. This 
does not mean that the focus of analysis is simply those interactions but must reveal “the 
complex interplay between established structures of domination, the elite ruling strategies 
and relations that emerge from creative engagement with the latter, and the modes of 
resistance which they, in turn, engender on the part of corporate agents formally excluded 
from the process and practice of elite rule” (Italics in original). The existence of enduring 
structures of domination confirm, it is argued, the “structural” elements that exist prior to and 
independent of practice albeit their continued existence (or transformation), which relies on 
their causal power will necessarily be mediated through human agency. 
In presenting CR as a providing a distinct ontology for institutionalism, which has 
been based on a criticism of Giddens’ particular account of structuring it should be 
recognized that the “third way” that has been associated with CR in management studies 
(Reed, 2005) has not been without criticism by other critical management scholars (Contu 
and Willmott, 2005) who are not convinced by the ontological benefits just outlined. For 
these commentator’s critical realists (and by implication advocates of CR for framing 
institutional theory) need to explain with greater clarity the pre-existence and ‘independence’ 
of the generative mechanisms that are thought to generate and shape events. The problem is 
that in proposing that generative mechanisms constitute the ontological domain of the real 
this demands that we accept the real a priori – it is a truism and so confounds adequate 
explanation (Contu and Willmott, 2005: 1649). Despite these problems the same protagonists 
recognize that CR does begin to throw light on questions such as “why is the world the way it 
is” and as such frame concerns over points of domination. In the case of the work of 
Delbridge and Edwards (2013) such questions allow us to unpack enduring power relations 
and struggles among different professional groups and how specific shipyard managers and 
independent designers have leveraged influence to overcome economic barriers and meaning 
systems to create a new type of superyacht offering. While there is no doubt for some the 
problem of meta-theory in CR is the assumption of the domain of the real it is also apparent 
that despite this the move to ask questions about the way institutionalization is by keeping 
agency and structure apart does offer opportunities to develop institutional theory in new 
directions. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has set-out to broadly map the ontological foundations of institutional 
theory following work on isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is significant 
because ‘ontology matters’: opinions about the way the social world is informs how we make 
sense of key relationships and the role of power in institutional processes. As I hope to have 
shown in this brief and stylised discussion these questions have remained largely obscured 
because there has been a reluctance to confront them. Once placed under the spotlight it is 
apparent that whilst there is unwillingness to countenance the possibility of reductionist 
approaches there is also a realisation that institutions are historical and therefore seemingly 
exist ‘out there’ at least as ‘prior’ features of the social world. This tension continues when 
understood from a praxis perspective because for some scholars - advocating a CR meta-
theory - the idea of the duality of structure restricts our understanding of the various ways 
actors and structures link and operate. The debate that is now gradually emerging concerns 
how we deal with the agency-structure relationship, which is a marked advance from where 
institutional scholars were at the end of the 1980s. What remains to be seen is how studies 
from these distinct ‘structuring’ schools of social reality – such as those inspired by Giddens 
and Archer - inform institutional scholarship into the future and what distinct contributions 
each make because of the differing ontological foundations (and problems associated with 
them) of that work.  
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